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COMMENT
CRACKING SHELLS: THE PANAMA PAPERS &
LOOKING TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE
AS A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING
A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT TO




In early 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists re-
leased a report detailing thousands of leaked documents demonstrating how a
Panamanian law firm had, for years, helped wealthy clients conceal their fi-
nancial activities through the use of offshore shell companies. The Panama
Papers, as the leaked documents came to be known, directed renewed atten-
tion at the use of shell companies. Shell companies are used by the world’s
wealthy and powerful to lower their taxes, but are also used by tax evaders,
criminal organizations, and terrorists. While much of the renewed attention
has been directed at offshore tax havens such as Panama, the United States is
itself considered a tax haven by many, largely due to states such as Delaware,
which has long catered to individuals desiring secrecy. In response to the Pan-
ama Papers, numerous international jurisdictions have looked to strengthen
their laws governing the creation of shell companies and considered the mech-
anisms used to facilitate exchanges of information. This Article will examine
one of those responses—the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Di-
rective—as an example of the changes the United States should apply to its
own domestic laws and as an example of the multilateral framework needed to
address a global issue. This Article will argue that the United States should
follow the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Directive’s lead in
strengthening its laws regarding the disclosure of beneficial ownership infor-
mation, creating shared registers of beneficial owners, implementing penalties
for noncomplying entities, and moving towards creating multilateral, as op-
posed to bilateral, agreements to combat the misuse of shell companies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the release of the “Panama Papers”—a report detail-
ing some eleven million leaked documents demonstrating how inter-
national banks and law firms have sold international secrecy to
clients—renewed scrutiny has been directed towards the use of shell
companies which, while not illegal, are often used by individuals to
launder money, evade taxes, and fund terrorism and criminal organi-
zations.1 This scrutiny has led to calls globally to implement new laws
and regulations that would increase the transparency of shell company
ownership and facilitate the exchange of financial information be-
tween jurisdictions.2 Much of the attention and criticism has been di-
rected towards traditional tax havens such as Panama and the
Bahamas, where American and European citizens are known to have
set up shell companies. However, the United States and European
Union member countries have also provided shell companies incorpo-
rated within their borders the same secrecy and protection that off-
shore tax havens have provided their corporate residents. In fact,
certain states in the United States, such as Delaware, are home to
some of the most corporation-friendly secrecy laws in the world.3
While the United States has historically refused to implement laws
increasing transparency regarding shell company ownership, the Euro-
pean Union has moved to combat the illegal use of shell companies by
amending its Anti-Money Laundering Directive (the “Directive”).4
The Directive requires Member States to strengthen their laws gov-
erning the disclosure of beneficial owners of shell companies and
1. Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 492–93
(2014).
2. Bruce Zagaris, President Obama Announces Initiatives on Tax and Entity
Transparency, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Corruption, 32 INT’L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 176 (May 2016).
3. Fred F. Murray et al., Turning the Tables: The United States as a Tax Haven
Destination, 2016 A.B.A. Tax-CLE 0507009.
4. See Jens H. Kunz & Matthias Schirmer, Key Elements of the 4th EU Anti-
Money Laundering Directive, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Sept. 2015), https://www.fin
ancierworldwide.com/key-elements-of-the-4th-eu-anti-money-laundering-directive/#
.WLY2bVfnsdU [https://perma.cc/57GB-VN6R].
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mandates the creation of shared registers of beneficial owners. This is
a strong example of the framework needed to combat the global issue
of the misuse of shell companies for illegal purposes. The United
States should follow suit by enacting similar laws within its own bor-
ders that are aimed at increasing transparency of shell company own-
ership and by entering into multilateral agreements with foreign
jurisdictions to facilitate the exchange of beneficial ownership
information.
This Article will discuss the issues surrounding shell companies and
examine the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Directive as
an example of the actions necessary to combat the illegal use of shell
companies. Section II of this Article generally discusses what shell
companies are and examines both the illegal and legal motivations for
creating shell companies. Section III provides a discussion of how the
United States is as much a tax haven as some offshore jurisdictions,
such as Panama. Specifically, the Section examines how Delaware’s
corporate laws attract and provide secrecy to countless shell compa-
nies. Section IV addresses the main changes needed to combat the
misuse of shell companies: (1) required disclosure of beneficial owners
and (2) the creation of shared registers of beneficial owners. Section V
discusses international organizations that have long sought to facili-
tate changes to increase transparency and also discusses how nations
have historically used bilateral agreements to bring about change. Fi-
nally, Section VI examines the European Union’s Anti-Money Laun-
dering Directive. This Section proposes that the requirements set
forth in the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Directive be
adopted by the United States as a means of strengthening domestic
laws in states such as Delaware and providing a framework for enter-
ing into multilateral agreements with other jurisdictions as a way of
combating the issues posed by shell companies.
II. THE PANAMA PAPERS
In April 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative Jour-
nalists (“ICIJ”) released a report detailing some eleven million leaked
documents exposing how international banks and law firms had sold
international secrecy to clients.5 The Panama Papers, as the leaked
documents came to be known, showed how individuals ranging from
Russian President Vladimir Putin to international soccer star Lionel
Messi had been involved in creating shell companies through a Pana-
manian law firm, Mossack Fonseca.6 While many of the individuals
named in the report had legitimate reasons for setting up shell compa-
5. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Giant Leak of Off-
shore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption, PAN. PA-
PERS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-
overview.html [https://perma.cc/CB8Y-XWU8] [hereinafter Investigation].
6. Id.
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nies, others set up shell companies to conceal illegal or unethical activ-
ities.7 One hundred twenty-eight politicians were named in the report,
including Iceland’s Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson,
who was forced to resign after it was discovered that he had ties to an
offshore shell company that held bonds in three failed Icelandic banks
that his government had negotiated a deal with during the 2008 finan-
cial crisis.8 Similar conflicts of interest involving other heads of states,
such as former British Prime Minister David Cameron, lead to up-
roars around the world.9 Other clients named in the report included
individuals and companies blacklisted by the United States Govern-
ment for having ties to terrorist and criminal organizations, such as
Mexican drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman.10 While the publica-
tion of the Panama Papers was not the first time the issues of shell
companies and tax havens had been brought under public scrutiny, the
report directed renewed attention towards the lack of transparency in
shell company ownership and revived demands for changes in the laws
governing the formation of shell companies.
III. SHELL COMPANIES
A. Definition
A shell company is an entity that has no significant assets or ongo-
ing business activities and “has disguised its ownership in order to op-
erate without scrutiny from law enforcement or the public.”11 Despite
having no assets or significant business activities, shell companies are
often used to transfer “large sums of money worldwide.”12 Addition-
ally, in many jurisdictions, individuals are able to create shell compa-
nies without having to disclose the identity of the beneficial owners of
the company.13 Beneficial owners are those who ultimately control
and benefit from a shell company.14 Furthermore, all that is often
needed to set up a shell company is the identity and address of a regis-




10. Id.; Christopher Woody, The World’s Most Powerful Drug Lord Has Been
Linked to the Panama Papers, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 7, 2016, 8:42 AM), http://www.busi
nessinsider.com/el-chapo-guzman-linked-to-the-panama-papers-2016-4 [https://perma
.cc/MS6B-ZF9G].
11. Anonymous Companies, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, http://www.gfintegrity.org/
issue/anonymous-companies/ [https://perma.cc/6H9S-T2TW] (last visited Sept. 22,
2017).
12. Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 492.
13. Dean Kalant, Comment, Who’s in Charge Here? Requiring More Trans-
parency in Corporate America: Advancements in Beneficial Ownership for Privately
Held Companies, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2009).
14. Max Biedermann, Article, G8 Principles: Identifying the Anonymous, 11 BYU
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 72, 74 (2015).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 132 (West 2010).
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tionship to the companies they represent; instead, they are simply
individuals available for hire.16 For example, in Delaware, roughly two
hundred registered agents represent the state’s more than one million
corporations.17 Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, the registered
agent may even be another company and not an individual, adding to
the layers of secrecy protecting the beneficial owner or owners of shell
companies.18 This lack of beneficial ownership disclosure is what
makes shell companies appealing to many individuals, as it is difficult
for private individuals and law enforcement to identify the true own-
ers of shell corporations.19 This protection from disclosure allows the
owners of shell companies to carry out financial activities, both legal
and illegal, out of sight from the watchful eyes of others.
B. Legal Uses of Shell Companies
While the more nefarious uses of shell companies often grab head-
lines, there are legitimate, legal reasons for creating a shell company
as well. For example, in some countries where kidnappings of wealthy
individuals or their family members for ransom are common, wealthy
individuals use shell companies to conceal their wealth. Other legiti-
mate reasons for setting up a shell company include using the com-
pany to finance foreign operations, to invest in foreign capital
markets, and to facilitate purchases or transfers of property or other
assets.20 However, perhaps the most common reason individuals set
up shell companies is for tax avoidance. Unlike tax evasion, which
refers to engaging in illegal activities to avoid taxes, tax avoidance re-
fers to engaging in legal activities to lower one’s taxes.21 “Tax avoid-
ance practices seek to accomplish one of three things: payment of ‘less
tax than might be required by a reasonable interpretation of a coun-
try’s law,’ payment of a tax on ‘profits declared in a country other
than where they were really earned,’ or tax payment that occurs
16. Alana Goodman, This Delaware Address Is Home to 200,000 Shell Compa-
nies—Including Hillary Clinton’s, WASH. FREE BEACON (Apr. 11, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://freebeacon.com/issues/delaware-address-home-200000-shell-companies-includ
ing-hillary-clintons/ [https://perma.cc/4LC6-68E4].
17. Suzanne Barlyn, Special Report: How Delaware Kept America Safe for Corpo-
rate Secrecy, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2016, 8:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-delaware-bullock-specialreport-idUSKCN10Z1OH [https://perma.cc/UH6N-
JUNM].
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 132 (West 2010).
19. Kalant, supra note 13, at 1060.
20. James Rosen, Is There Ever a Good Reason for Setting Up a Shell Company?,
MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 29, 2016, 2:16 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/busi
ness/biz-monday/article74737252.html [https://perma.cc/Y2R3-LZL9]; see also The
Data Team, The Secretive and Morally Dubious World of Shell Companies, ECONO-
MIST (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/04/using-and-
abusing-offshore-accounts [https://perma.cc/5NTF-KD48].
21. Jasmine M. Fisher, Note, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Cor-
porate Social Responsibility, 94 B.U. L. REV. 337, 339 (2014).
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‘somewhat later than [when] the profits were earned.’”22 Numerous
multinational companies such as Google, Starbucks, and Amazon
have all been linked to shell companies in efforts to lower taxes
through legal tax avoidance practices, such as transfer pricing.23 While
some may find tax avoidance practices unethical, they are nonetheless
legal and shell companies are instrumental to those engaging in tax
avoidance practices.24
C. Illegal Uses of Shell Companies
Though legitimate reasons for creating shell companies exist, shell
companies are often used for tax evasion.25 While numerous tax eva-
sion schemes exist, an especially prevalent form of tax evasion is trade
misinvoicing. Unlike transfer pricing, which is a legal form of tax
avoidance, trade misinvoicing, a similar practice, is not. Trade mis-
invoicing is “a form of trade fraud where someone misrepresents the
value or amount of a good they’re importing or exporting. This allows
them to evade taxes and gain subsidies, as well as take ‘dirty money’
made in illicit ways and reintegrate it into the formal finance world
. . . .”26 Trade misinvoicing is especially prevalent in developing coun-
tries, such as those in Africa, where a recent report from Global Fi-
nancial Integrity “found that developing countries ‘lost $7.8 trillion in
illicit financial flows from 2004 through 2013’” and estimated that
roughly 80% of that loss was the result of trade misinvoicing.27 It is
believed shell companies contribute to this loss as they are “often used
to hide money that is illicitly taken out of developing countries.”28 The
use of shell companies is especially concerning since “[d]eveloping
countries are particularly vulnerable” to trade misinvoicing schemes
since the distinction between legal transfer pricing and illegal trade
misinvoicing is not always easily identifiable and the “responsibility to
investigate and evaluate transfer pricing strategies largely falls on the
shoulders of local governments, which have neither the time nor re-
22. Id. at 340.
23. See Michael Winter, Google Dodged $2 Billion in Taxes Using a Shell Com-
pany in Bermuda, USA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2012, 7:53 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/2012/12/10/google-bermuda-shell-company-2-billion-tax-dodge/1759833/>
[https://perma.cc/7EAS-D86U]; see also Michele Fletcher, The Transfer Pricing Laby-
rinth, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY (June 26, 2014), http://www.gfintegrity.org/transfer-
pricing-labyrinth/ [https://perma.cc/C2SQ-4HJN].
24. See Winter, supra note 23.
25. See generally David Spencer, International Tax Evasion: Enablers and Shell
Corporations (Part 1), 18 J. INT’L TAX’N 44 (2007).
26. Drake Baer, Shell Companies Hide About $1 Trillion Taken from Poor Coun-
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sources” to effectively assess and monitor the activity.29 While trade
misinvoicing is only one example of a tax evasion scheme that shell
companies help protect, the secrecy shell companies provide likely en-
ables others tax evasion methods as well.30
While tax evasion might be considered a less-than-significant white
collar crime, a much greater criticism of shell companies is that they
are often used by criminals and terrorist organizations to finance their
operations.31 Cases in which criminals or terrorists have used shell
companies to manage their funds are well documented, such as with
Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout.32 Bout, a Russian arms dealer who
was recently sentenced to twenty-five years in federal prison for con-
spiring to kill Americans, was found to have used at least twelve shell
companies in Delaware to operate his business of selling weapons to
terrorists and criminal organizations around the world.33 Numerous
other criminals, such as Mexican drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guz-
man, have been connected to shell companies; likewise, it is widely
believed that terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda use shell
companies to conceal their global financial activities.34 Historically,
the banks and law firms that help individuals create shell companies
have been the ones responsible for screening potential clients and
identifying individuals who pose a high risk for either engaging in ille-
gal activity or having connections to blacklisted individuals and orga-
nizations.35 However, studies show that firms have been unlikely to
adhere to screening and reporting standards when approached by cli-
ents posing a high risk of being engaged in, or related to, terrorist
activities and organizations.36 Instead, a recent study found that firms
in many jurisdictions, including some in the United States, were found
to exhibit little hesitation in offering to help individuals create shell
29. Fletcher, supra note 23.
30. See Baer, supra note 26.
31. See Biedermann, supra note 14, at 72–73.
32. Id. at 73; Karl Baker, Delaware Seeks Compromise in Anti-Money Laundering
Fight, DEL. ONLINE (Sept. 20, 2016, 2:09 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/
news/2016/09/16/delaware-seeks-compromise-anti-money-laundering-fight/90412966/
[https://perma.cc/Z7W7-TELW].
33. Lynnley Browning, Delaware Laws, Helpful to Arms Trafficker, to Be Scruti-
nized, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/business/05tax
.html [https://perma.cc/J8CN-KZRB]; Benjamin Weiser, Departing Judge Offers Blunt
Defense of Ruling in Stop-and-Frisk Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016), http://www.ny
times.com/2016/05/02/nyregion/departing-judge-offers-blunt-defense-of-ruling-that-
ended-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/G6YE-6E73]; Stefanie Ostfeld,
Shell Game: Hidden Owners and Motives, CNN (Sept. 11, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www
.cnn.com/2011/10/26/opinion/ostfeld-shell-companies/ [https://perma.cc/3AL2-
SWGW].
34. Anne L. Clunan, The Fight Against Terrorist Financing, 121 POL. SCI. Q. 569,
570 (2006); Melanie Hicken & Blake Ellis, These U.S. Companies Hide Drug Dealers,
Mobsters and Terrorists, CNN (Dec. 9, 2015, 4:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/
12/09/news/shell-companies-crime/ [https://perma.cc/A3AW-WQS4].
35. Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 522–23.
36. Id. at 514.
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companies “regardless of the risks involved and the information pro-
vided.”37 One explanation for this trend is that, in some jurisdictions,
firms involved in facilitating the formation of shell companies face few
repercussions for failing to properly screen potential clients. Thus,
some believe that to curb the illegal use of shell companies, stricter
screening requirements and penalties for noncomplying firms are
necessary.38
D. The United States as a Tax Haven
While shell companies are often associated with offshore tax
havens, such as the Bahamas, Panama, and the Cayman Islands, tax
havens include nations of all sizes and locations. In fact, one of the
world’s largest tax havens is the United States.39 Despite the Panama
Papers being the largest leak of financial documents in history, rela-
tively few Americans were named in the report.40 One explanation for
this is that Americans do not need to look to offshore jurisdictions to
hide their financial activities behind shell corporations.41 Instead,
Americans need only look to states such as Delaware and Nevada
which are home to some of the most business-friendly secrecy laws in
the world.42 In fact, the United States was ranked third—ahead of the
Cayman Islands and Panama—in the 2015 Financial Secrecy Index, a
report published by the Tax Justice Network which “ranks jurisdic-
tions according to their secrecy and the scale of their offshore finan-
cial activities . . . . ”43 While the United States has directed criticism
toward offshore tax havens for providing American citizens with the
means of concealing their financial activities from the eyes of United
States’ law enforcement and tax authorities, many foreign countries
have directed similar criticism at the United States for allowing for-
eign citizens to conduct financial activities in the United States that
are beyond the reach and vision of their home countries.44
37. Id. at 514–15.
38. Id. at 528 (discussing the importance of working with the private sector to curb
terrorism financing).
39. Jesse Drucker, The World’s Favorite New Tax Haven Is the United States,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2016, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-01-27/the-world-s-favorite-new-tax-haven-is-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/
8RXB-YJF4].
40. Panama Papers: Where Are the Americans?, BBC (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www
.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35966612 [https://perma.cc/LDR3-4BU8].
41. Id.
42. See Delaware: The US Corporate Secrecy Haven, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan.
12, 2016), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/delaware_the_us_corporate_se
crecy_haven [https://perma.cc/3H7T-N3GG].
43. Financial Secrecy Index, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www
.financialsecrecyindex.com [https://perma.cc/69GM-6BD7].
44. Ana Swanson, How the U.S. Became One of the World’s Biggest Tax Havens,
WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/
05/how-the-u-s-became-one-of-the-worlds-biggest-tax-havens/ [https://perma.cc/
LK8J-A2JK].
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The United States’ ranking in the Financial Secrecy Index as a tax
haven was largely due to the state of Delaware, whose secrecy laws
have attracted more than one million businesses to incorporate in the
state—a number greater than Delaware’s population.45 In addition to
the thousands of American shell companies formed in Delaware, Del-
aware also attracts a large number of foreign companies and clients
seeking to set up shell companies.46 What makes Delaware attractive
to individuals is not only the State’s secrecy laws, but the ease with
which a shell company can be created. By many accounts, a Delaware
shell company can be set up in as little as one hour by any of the
numerous incorporation services located in the state.47 All that is
needed to set up a company is the name and address of a registered
agent located in the State.48 The registered agent may be the company
itself, another domestic or foreign business, or any individual resident
of Delaware.49 Since any resident of Delaware may act as the regis-
tered agent of a company, many companies hire lawyers or bankers
with no significant relationship to the company to act as their regis-
tered agent. In fact, individuals often act as registered agents for mul-
tiple corporations.50 Additionally, since the given address does not
need to be a corporation’s place of business, numerous corporations
often share the same registered address, such as one notorious address
that is home to over 285,000 companies.51 Thus, Delaware’s incorpo-
ration laws allow the true owners or beneficiaries of shell companies
to create corporations without disclosing any identifying information.
While Delaware’s secrecy laws have attracted scores of legitimate
businesses to the State, the laws have also attracted criminals such as
Viktor Bout and Jack Abramoff. Abramoff, a former lobbyist, de-
frauded and laundered millions of dollars through a shell company set
up in Delaware that was run “by a lifeguard out of a beach house.”52
Despite receiving criticism from other jurisdictions, Delaware de-
pends on its secrecy laws to draw business to the State. In 2011, for
example, roughly a quarter of Delaware’s budget was derived from
45. ST. DEL., https://corp.delaware.gov (last visited Oct. 8, 2016) (claiming Dela-
ware is home to more than one million companies) [https://perma.cc/E9AD-GGCQ];
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/10 (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2016) (listing Delaware’s population at 952,065) [https://perma.cc/JQ6W-
9YTP].
46. Swanson, supra note 44.
47. Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-
as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html [https://perma.cc/7VK9-DC4Q].
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 131–132 (West 2010).
49. Id. § 132.
50. See Barlyn, supra note 17.
51. Wayne, supra note 47.
52. Suzanne Barlyn, Special Report: How Delaware Kept America Safe for Corpo-
rate Secrecy, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2016, 8:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-delaware-bullock-specialreport-idUSKCN10Z1OH [https://perma.cc/UH6N-
JUNM].
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taxes and fees collected from its absentee corporate residents.53 This
reliance on corporate residents is the reason Delaware has long been
one of the staunchest resistors of increased transparency in shell com-
pany ownership.54 Prior to his retirement, former Senator Carl Levin
tried for years to bring greater transparency to corporations in the
United States through the Incorporation Transparency and Law En-
forcement Assistance Act (“ITLEAA”).55 The bill sought to increase
transparency by requiring the disclosure of beneficial owners of cor-
porations. Specifically, the bill would require corporations and limited
liability companies to: (1) use an incorporation system to provide and
update lists of their beneficial owners; (2) maintain beneficial owner-
ship information for five years after the corporation terminates; and
(3) provide such information pursuant to certain criminal, civil, or ad-
ministrative requests.56 However, the bill was met with strong opposi-
tion from states such as Delaware and has yet to pass despite repeated
attempts in the Senate.57 While the United States may direct criticism
at foreign jurisdictions for facilitating tax evasion and other crimes
through shell companies, the United States must first address secrecy
laws in states such as Delaware, which is as much a tax haven as are
foreign jurisdictions such as Panama.
IV. NECESSARY CHANGES
In addition to implementing stricter screening requirements and
noncompliance penalties for the firms and banks that help individuals
form shell companies, advocates for increased transparency often
stress the need for (1) requiring the disclosure of beneficial owners
when creating shell companies and (2) creating shared registers of
beneficial owners.58
A. Disclosure of Beneficial Owners
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 defines beneficial owner
as any “person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, ar-
rangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares:
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the
voting of, such security; and/or, (2) Investment power which includes
53. Wayne, supra note 47.
54. Libby Watson, Why Are There So Many Anonymous Companies in Delaware?,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 6, 2016, 12:59 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/
2016/04/06/why-are-there-so-many-anonymous-corporations-in-delaware/ [https://per
ma.cc/KUH8-3RMX].
55. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465,
113th Cong. (2013).
56. Id.
57. Watson, supra note 54.
58. Biedermann, supra note 14, at 83–84.
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the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security.”59
Other definitions of beneficial owner include any “individual who has
a level of control over, or entitlement to, the funds or assets of a cor-
poration or . . . [LLC] that, as a practical matter, enables the individ-
ual, directly or indirectly, to control, manage, or direct the corporation
or . . . [LLC].” More simply put, beneficial owners are “persons who
exercise ultimate effective control over . . . [an] arrangement.”60 Re-
gardless of the definition, beneficial owners are the true owners of a
shell company. Since shell companies are often criticized for allowing
individuals to engage in illegal financial activities, many argue that in
order to effectively combat financial crimes—it is imperative that in-
formation regarding beneficial owners is collected upon creation.61
However, those opposed to mandating the disclosure of beneficial
owners argue that disclosure is unnecessary because “beneficial own-
ership transparency has not posed a significant problem” and law en-
forcement in countries such as the United States already possesses a
wide “range of investigatory powers to compel the disclosure of bene-
ficial ownership information” if necessary.62 This argument is unper-
suasive however, since, as the Panama Papers have once again shown,
shell companies are often misused by individuals, many of whom
never face any repercussions for their illegal or unethical activities due
to the inability of law enforcement to identify them.63
B. Shared Registers of Beneficial Owners
The second major change often called for is the creation of shared
registers of beneficial owners. Proponents of shared registers argue
that registers would allow government and law enforcement agencies
to easily share information to identify the true owners of shell compa-
nies.64 This sharing of information would enable law enforcement and
tax authorities to better track funds being moved across jurisdictional
lines to combat tax evasion and other crimes. While many countries
and states already have beneficial owner registers, many registers are
not shared between jurisdictions and differ in the quality and scope of
information collected.65 For example, in the Bahamas, while the
names of directors are required to be disclosed for the national regis-
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2010); Avnita
Lakhani, Imposing Company Ownership Transparency Requirements: Opportunities
for Effective Governance of Equity Capital Markets or Constraints on Corporate Per-
formance, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 122, 131 (2016).
60. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 569,
111th Cong. §3(a)(1) (2009) (noting the amendment to (a)(1) and addition of (e)(1));
Kalant, supra note 13, at 1051; Biedermann, supra note 14, at 74.
61. Biedermann, supra note 14, at 74.
62. Kalant, supra note 13, at 1063.
63. Investigation, supra note 5.
64. Biedermann, supra note 14, at 86.
65. Id.
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ter when forming a company, much of the information entered in the
register is incomplete.66 Additionally, to obtain a Bahamian com-
pany’s information, a fee is required to search the register.67 Finally,
foreign investigators who are granted permission to search the register
are hampered by the complication that “directors’ names cannot be
searched individually or without preexisting knowledge of the Baha-
mian company’s name.”68 Another issue regarding current registers is
that while jurisdictions can request beneficial ownership information
from other states or countries, jurisdictions may not comply with re-
quests in a timely or complete fashion.69 To remedy this issue, the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
has created a model treaty to mandate the automatic exchange of in-
formation between foreign jurisdictions which multiple countries
voiced their support for at a recent G8 Summit.70 If implemented, the
treaty would allow law enforcement to quickly and easily obtain bene-
ficial owner information from foreign jurisdictions. However, while
countries often voice their support for measures, widespread imple-
mentation is often hard to accomplish.
V. HOW TO ACCOMPLISH CHANGE
A. International Organizations
One organization that has, for years, suggested and helped create
numerous policies and agreements aimed at increasing global corpo-
rate transparency is the OECD.71 The OECD is an organization com-
prised of thirty-nine member countries that account for nearly 80% of
the world’s trade and investment.72 The OECD has helped implement
plans and standards to increase transparency in an effort to curb the
illicit flow and use of currency through shell companies. Recent stan-
dards include the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Ac-
count Information in Tax Matters and the Base Erosion and Profit
66. See Will Fitzgibbon & Emilia Dı́az-Struck, Former EU Official Among Politi-





69. See Hedda Leikvang, Note, Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: Securing Effective Ex-
change of Information to Remedy the Harmful Effects of Tax Havens, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 293, 316–17 (2012) (discussing issues with information exchange).
70. Biedermann, supra note 14, at 83; see also Itai Greenberg, The Battle over
Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 304, 331 (2012).
71. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/TYS5-DNE4].
72. History, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/2FVS-
SEWS].
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Shifting Project.73 The Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial
Account Information in Tax Matters created “a new single standard
for automatic exchange of information, including the technical modal-
ities, to better fight tax evasion and ensure tax compliance” and “calls
on jurisdictions to obtain information from their financial institutions
and automatically exchange that information with other jurisdictions
on an annual basis.”74 The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project is
an action plan developed “to address base erosion and profit shifting”
which “identifies a series of domestic and international actions to ad-
dress the problem.”75 While these actions show a desire to cultivate
change, member countries have often failed to fully comply with or
implement the suggested or agreed-upon changes. For example, in
2000, the OECD placed the Bahamas on a blacklist of countries that
aid tax evasion and only later removed it after the country had imple-
mented new laws in line with recommended standards to address
some of the tax evasion concerns.76 However, the Bahamas was
placed on the OECD’s gray list in 2009; thus signifying that although
its noncompliance with international standards did not warrant place-
ment on the blacklist, its noncompliance was still a serious concern.77
“Although the OECD now considers the Bahamas compliant, in June
2015, the European Union listed the Bahamas” as a tax haven.78 The
Bahamas is not the only country that has refused to conform to inter-
national standards over the years. Numerous countries, including the
United States, have been criticized for failing to meet OECD stan-
dards. Similar international standards set by other international orga-
nizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), “an
inter-governmental body established . . . [to] promote effective imple-
mentation of legal, regulatory[,] and operational measures for com-
bating money laundering, terrorist financing[,] and other related
threats to the integrity of the international financial system,” have also
struggled to achieve widespread implementation of standards and
agreements.79 While the standards set by the OECD and FATF could
73. Panama Joins International Efforts Against Tax Evasion and Avoidance,
OECD (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/panama-joins-international-efforts-
against-tax-evasion-and-avoidance.htm [https://perma.cc/389T-BL4R].
74. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT IN-
FORMATION IN TAX MATTERS 311 (July 21, 2014), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxa-
tion/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-mat
ters_9789264216525-en [https://perma.cc/B2XH-DPVN].
75. Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD (July 19, 2013), http://
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/action-plan-on-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-97892642027
19-en.htm [https://perma.cc/RN2V-VYWD].
76. Fitzgibbon & Diaz-Struck, supra note 66.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Who We Are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/2GDF-A8BZ].
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help increase transparency if adopted, without effective enforcement
mechanisms, widespread compliance is unlikely.80
B. Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties
While international organizations such as the OECD have been
helpful in facilitating some change, the more common and effective
way jurisdictions have facilitated the exchange of financial informa-
tion with other jurisdictions is through the use of bilateral agreements,
which are treaties between two nations.81 Although bilateral agree-
ments can be helpful in facilitating the exchange of information, they
nonetheless have many shortcomings. A major issue with bilateral
agreements in combating the illegal use of shell companies is the lim-
ited scope of the agreements.82 Since bilateral agreements only in-
volve two countries, they do little to tackle global problems, such as
the widespread use and creation of shell companies. Even where bilat-
eral agreements successfully facilitate the exchange of information be-
tween countries, including those that are tax havens, tax evaders and
criminals can simply move to another foreign jurisdiction that does
not have a bilateral agreement with their home jurisdiction.83 The na-
ture of bilateral agreements also tends to favor more-developed coun-
tries that possess superior bargaining positions and leverage.84 This
dichotomy of bargaining power often leaves less-developed countries
reluctant to enter into bilateral agreements with countries such as the
United States.85 Bilateral agreements also typically “impose a ‘dual
criminality’ requirement, meaning that the activity related to the in-
formation sought must constitute crimes” in both the requesting and
receiving country.86 Thus, as a result of the lenient tax laws in many
tax haven jurisdictions, tax-related offenses are often not considered
crimes. Therefore, many requests for information do not meet the
dual criminality requirement needed for an exchange of information.87
Instead, for many jurisdictions to obtain financial information regard-
ing an individual, the “individual must be suspected of a crime other
than tax evasion before authorities can request information about the
individual.”88 A related issue is that bilateral agreements “usually only
require information exchange upon specific requests relating to partic-
ular individuals, requiring the IRS [and similar foreign tax authorities]
to identify the potential tax evaders in advance.”89 Lastly, some juris-
80. Fisher, supra note 21, at 358.
81. Leikvang, supra note 69, at 314.
82. Id. at 316.
83. Id. at 318.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 316.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 316–17.
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dictions have local laws requiring that suspects be notified that their
financial information has been requested prior to exchanging the in-
formation with the requesting jurisdiction.90 This allows the suspects
an opportunity to move assets or take other preemptive measures to
further protect their identities or activities.91
While bilateral agreements can be helpful in targeting specific tax
havens, they do little to remedy the larger issues surrounding shell
companies formed in tax havens across the globe. A more far-reaching
agreement is a multilateral agreement. Unlike bilateral agreements,
which are between two countries, multilateral agreements are be-
tween three or more countries. While multilateral agreements are, no
doubt, more difficult to create, the wide nets they cast are a far more
effective means of tackling wide-spread issues, such as the global use
of shell companies.
VI. EUROPEAN UNION ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE
A promising multilateral agreement addressing the issues surround-
ing shell companies and other financial arrangements is the European
Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Directive (“AMLD”). Amended in
2016, the AMLD was enacted in response to the realization that, while
all European Union Member States criminalize money laundering,
“existing differences in the definition, scope and sanctions of money
laundering offences affect cross-border police and judicial cooperation
between national authorities as well as the exchange of information”
and that “[t]hese differences in legal frameworks can also be exploited
by criminals and terrorists, who could carry out financial transactions
where they perceive anti-money laundering measures to be weak-
est.”92 To remedy these weaknesses, the AMLD requires all members
of the European Union to improve their anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorism financing rules by strengthening national laws gov-
erning disclosure of beneficial owners and by creating shared registers
of beneficial owners.93
The European Union’s AMLD defines a beneficial owner as “the
natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity
through direct or indirect ownership of a sufficient percentage of the
shares or voting rights or ownership interest in that entity . . . .”94
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Security Union: Proposal for a Directive on Countering Money Laundering by
Criminal Law – Questions & Answers, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Dec. 21, 2016), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4452_en.htm [https://perma.cc/MZ4H-
VNV3].
93. Kunz & Schirmer, supra note 4; The Fourth EU Anti Money Laundering Di-
rective, DELOITTE 2 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ie/Docu
ments/FinancialServices/investmentmanagement/ie_2015_The_Fourth_EU_Anti_
Money_Laundering_Directive_Deloitte_Ireland.pdf [https://perma.cc/27A7-LCGU].
94. Council Directive 2015/849 art. 3(6)(a)(i), 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73, 86 (EU).
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While the Directive allows Member States to designate a lower per-
centage as an indication of ownership or control, the Directive sets a
“shareholding of 25%” or more as the standard indication of owner-
ship.95 The Directive requires that “Member States shall ensure that
corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory
are required to obtain and hold adequate, accurate[,] and current in-
formation on their beneficial ownership, including the details of the
beneficial interests held.”96 The Directive further requires that the
beneficial owner information obtained “is held in a central register in
each Member State”97 and that the register information is accessible
to all “competent authorities and [Financial Intelligence Units],”
“obliged entities” for purposes of customer due diligence, and to “any
person or organisation that can demonstrate a legitimate interest” in
the information.98 Opponents of increased transparency often point to
the need for secrecy for wealthy individuals who are targets for crimes
such as kidnapping and blackmail.99 However, the AMLD provides
for an exception whereby “Member States may provide for an exemp-
tion to the access . . . to all or part of the information on the beneficial
ownership on a case-by-case basis in exceptional circumstances, where
such access would expose the beneficial owner to the risk of fraud,
kidnapping, blackmail, violence[,] or intimidation, or where the bene-
ficial owner is a minor or otherwise incapable.”100
In addition to addressing transparency issues by requiring the dis-
closure of beneficial owners and creating shared registers, the Direc-
tive also addresses enforcement issues. Whereas in some countries the
custom is to alert individuals when a foreign jurisdiction has requested
information on them, the AMLD stipulates that “[o]bliged entities
and their directors and employees shall not disclose to the customer
concerned or to other third persons the fact that information is being,
will be[,] or has been transmitted in accordance with Article 33 or 34
or that a money laundering or terrorist financing analysis is being, or
may be, carried out.”101 The Directive also addresses information
sharing issues between jurisdictions. While some jurisdictions have, in
the past, refused to disclose information adequately and promptly, the
Directive requires that Member State Financial Intelligence Units
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 30(1), at 96.
97. Id. art. 30(3), at 97.
98. Id. art. 30(5)(a)–(c), at 97.
99. See Gregory Crawford, Shell Companies’ Secrecy Provides Personal Security,
NY TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016, 3:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/
07/cracking-shell-company-secrecy/shell-companies-secrecy-provides-personal-secur
ity [https://perma.cc/YKW5-FU83].
100. Council Directive 2015/849 art. 30(9), at 97.
101. Id. art. 39(1), at 100.
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provide prompt and complete information to requesting parties who
comply with procedures.102
The AMLD places responsibility on entities that are instrumental in
the formation of shell companies, such as law firms and banks, to con-
duct due diligence when taking on a new client and to practice ongo-
ing monitoring of the business in order to determine beneficial owner
information as well as any indications of illegal activity. This due dili-
gence includes:
(a) identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity
on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from
a reliable and independent source;
(b) identifying the beneficial owner and taking reasonable mea-
sures to verify that person’s identity so that the obliged entity
is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, including,
as regards legal persons, trusts, companies, foundations and
similar legal arrangements, taking reasonable measures to un-
derstand the ownership and control structure of the customer;
(c) assessing and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the
purpose and intended nature of the business relationship;
(d) conducting ongoing monitoring of the business relationship in-
cluding scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the
course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions be-
ing conducted are consistent with the obliged entity’s knowl-
edge of the customer, the business and risk profile, including
where necessary the source of funds and ensuring that the doc-
uments, data or information held are kept up-to-date.103
Additionally, the Directive also calls for enhanced due diligence when
dealing with persons or entities from third-party countries identified
as high-risk third-party countries.104 However, what is arguably the
most important aspect of the AMLD is its allowance for the use of
sanctions against obliged entities that breach the terms of the Direc-
tive. The Directive sets forth that “Member States shall ensure that
obliged entities can be held liable for breaches of national provisions
transposing this Directive in accordance with this Article and . . . [that
any] resulting sanction or measure shall be effective, proportionate
and dissuasive.”105 Specifically, the Directive provides that:
Member States shall ensure that in the cases referred to in para-
graph 1 [regarding obliged entities], the administrative sanctions
and measures that can be applied include at least the following:
(a) a public statement which identifies the natural or legal per-
son and the nature of the breach;
(b) an order requiring the natural or legal person to cease the
conduct and to desist from repetition of that conduct;
102. See id. art. 53, at 106.
103. Id. art. 13(1), at 92.
104. Id. art. 18, at 94.
105. Id. art. 58(1), at 107.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\twl104.txt unknown Seq: 18 19-DEC-17 13:42
150 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
(c) where an obliged entity is subject to an authorisation, with-
drawal or suspension of the authorisation;
(d) a temporary ban against any person discharging managerial
responsibilities in an obliged entity, or any other natural
person, held responsible for the breach, from exercising
managerial functions in obliged entities;
(e) maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least
twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach
where that benefit can be determined, or at least EUR
1[,]000[,]000.106
This use of sanctions against obliged entities who fail to conduct rea-
sonable due diligence serves as a strong deterrent for those firms and
individuals who previously would have turned a blind eye to high-risk
clients likely to engage in illegal activities.
The European Union’s AMLD is a strong example of the frame-
work needed to combat the negative effects associated with financial
secrecy provided by shell companies. The Directive addresses the un-
derlying issue of transparency by requiring disclosure of beneficial
owners when creating shell companies and by placing a responsibility
of due diligence on the private sector individuals and entities who help
set up shell companies. The Directive addresses enforcement concerns
by granting “greater power to tax authorities to investigate crime”107
through the creation of shared registers of beneficial owners and by
creating a mechanism for imposing “severe financial penalties for non-
compliance” on noncomplying entities.108 In addition to addressing
these major concerns, the Directive also addresses smaller issues by
requiring “[a]dditional due diligence checks . . . on money flowing
from a list of non-EU countries with deficiencies in their anti-money
laundering prevention regimes” and by creating reasonable exceptions
such as restricting access to information regarding individuals at a risk
of kidnapping.109
An example of the AMLD in action can be seen in recent actions
taken by the United Kingdom.110 Prior to the leak of the Panama Pa-
pers, the United Kingdom became the first government to create a
“fully public beneficial ownership” register of companies in the
United Kingdom.111 The United Kingdom’s PSC Register requires
106. Id. art. 59(2), at 108.
107. Mark Taylor, EU Nears Agreement on Delayed Anti-Money Laundering Laws,




110. Katharine Murphy, Australia to Follow UK in Creating Public Register of Shell
Companies, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2016, 12:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/wor
ld/2016/apr/22/australia-to-follow-uk-in-creating-public-register-of-shell-companies
[https://perma.cc/S3JZ-J2XV].
111. Beneficial Ownership, FIN. TRANSPARENCY COAL., https://financialtransparen
cy.org/issues/beneficial-ownership/ [https://perma.cc/CX28-CMJ5].
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that the officer of a company identify the people with significant con-
trol (“PSCs”) over the company, record the PSC’s information in the
company’s own register, report the same information to the shared
national register, and keep the registers updated.112 An individual is
considered a PSC if they meet one of the following five criteria: (1)
“an individual who holds more than 25% of shares in the company”;
(2) “an individual who holds more than 25% of voting rights in the
company”; (3) “an individual who holds the right to appoint or re-
move the majority of the board of directors of the company”; (4) “an
individual who has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, signifi-
cant influence or control over the company”; or (5) “where a trust or
firm would satisfy one of the first four conditions if it were an individ-
ual . . . , any individual holding the right to exercise, or actually exer-
cising, significant influence or control over the activities of that trust
or firm.”113 Information including each PSC’s name, service address,
residential address, date of becoming a PSC, and criteria for qualify-
ing as a PSC is required to be disclosed.114 The law also permits fines
and prison sentences for individuals who fail to accurately provide the
required information115 in addition to allowing anyone to request to
see PSC information.116 Numerous other European Union member
countries such as Germany, Hungary, and Sweden have either already
passed or are expected to pass bills creating registers similar to the
United Kingdom’s PSC Register to conform with the AMLD’s
requirements.117
The United States should follow the European Union’s lead in en-
acting similar laws consistent with those set forth in the AMLD. The
United States first needs to address issues with laws governing the
creation of shell companies within the United States by requiring the
disclosure of beneficial owners, creating shared registers, and impos-
ing penalties for noncomplying entities who fail to conduct reasonable
due diligence when helping clients create shell companies. The United
States should then look to enter into multilateral or regional agree-
ments with other tax havens in the Caribbean and elsewhere to facili-
tate the effective exchange of information. While states and offshore
jurisdictions that benefit from the proceeds of shell companies such as
112. Summary Guide for Companies – Register of People with Significant Control,
GOV.UK 1, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/555657/PSC_register_summary_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9CQ-ZWAP].
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id. at 3–4.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Beneficial Ownership Register Opens on 6 April 2016, BDO U.K. (Feb. 15,
2016), https://www.bdo.co.uk/en-gb/insights/business-edge/business-edge-2016/benefi
cial-ownership-register-opens-on-6-april-201 [https://perma.cc/P45Y-T5MQ].
117. Implementation Overview: 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD4)
Regarding the UBO-register, NAUTADUTILH (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.nautadutilh
.com/siteassets/documents/overview-implementation-amld-4-eu.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V9S9-KLED].
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Delaware and Panama are likely to continue to object to any attempts
at increasing transparency, the harm and risk that financial secrecy
and shell companies pose to countries outweigh the benefits that se-
crecy provides to individual users of shell companies.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Panama Papers have directed renewed attention at the use of
shell companies to engage in illegal activities. While shell companies
can be used for legitimate, legal purposes, the instances where they
are used to conceal criminal or terrorist activities are far too common.
Shell companies have been used by individuals such as international
arms dealer Viktor Bout, Mexican drug lord Joaqin “El Chapo” Guz-
man, and lobbyist-turned-criminal Jack Abramoff.118 Even where
shell companies are not used to conceal illegal activities, the secrecy
they provide to their beneficial owners is controversial. Numerous
politicians such as Argentine President Mauricio Macri, former Ice-
landic Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson, former British
Prime Minister David Cameron, Russian President Vladimir Putin,
and Chinese President Xi Jinping have all faced intense criticism and,
in some cases, been forced to resign from office for using shell compa-
nies to hide conflicts of interests.119 Countless countries including the
United States, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Kenya, and the
United Kingdom have either conducted investigations into shell com-
panies or announced policy changes regarding regulations of shell
companies or both.120 While the issues surrounding shell companies
have been discussed and argued for years, significant actions have, for
the most part, not been taken.
While much attention since the release of the Panama Papers has
been directed at tax havens such as Panama and the Bahamas, the
United States is as much of a tax haven as many offshore jurisdic-
tions.121 States such as Delaware reap enormous profits off the secrecy
their laws provide to individuals and businesses looking to keep their
financial activities hidden, and it is these jurisdictions that have de-
feated past efforts to enact changes designed to increase trans-
parency.122 However, the Panama Papers have once again shown that
the need to prevent illegal uses of shell companies outweighs the ben-
efits shell companies provide. To prevent misuse, it is necessary to re-
118. Browning, supra note 33; Woody, supra note 10; Barlyn, supra note 17.
119. Jeremy Maltby & Grant Damon-Feng, The Panama Papers: The Story So Far,




121. Swanson, supra note 44.
122. Watson, supra note 54.
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quire the disclosure of beneficial owners when creating shell
companies and to create shared registers of beneficial owners to effec-
tively police and investigate misuse of shell companies. Since the ille-
gal use of shell companies is a global issue, a global response is
required to effectively police the issue. While the use of bilateral
agreements may be effective in eliminating certain jurisdictions as tax
havens, individuals will simply continue moving to jurisdictions that
do not enter into bilateral agreements with other nations.123 Instead,
what is needed are multilateral agreements that encompass numerous
jurisdictions. The European Union’s AMLD is a good example of the
multilateral framework necessary to accomplish this goal. The AMLD
requires disclosure of beneficial owners, mandates the creation of
shared registers, provides for penalties to be imposed on noncomply-
ing entities, and addresses other smaller issues and exceptions.124 The
United States would be well-advised to follow the European Union’s
lead in addressing transparency issues regarding shell companies. The
United States should first look to address transparency issues in states
such as Delaware that cater to those seeking secrecy by implementing
laws similar to those set forth in the European Union’s AMLD. The
United States should then look to enter into multilateral agreements,
as opposed to bilateral agreements, with foreign jurisdictions to facili-
tate the exchange of information to crack the shells of secrecy that
shell companies provide to those attempting to evade taxes, fund ter-
rorist and criminal organizations, or otherwise conceal illegal and un-
ethical activities.
123. Leikvang, supra note 69, at 318.
124. Kunz & Schirmer, supra note 4; The Fourth EU Anti Money Laundering Di-
rective, supra note 92.
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